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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Federal Income Taxation-DEDUCTIBILITY OF START-UP EXPENDI-
TURES UNDER SECTION 162-THE "CLEAR-REFLECTION-OF-IN-
COME" TEST
Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th
Cir. 1974), AND First Security Bank of Idaho v. Commissioner, 63
T.C. 644, CCH 1975 TAX CT. REP. Dec. No. 33,081 (1975).
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code ["Code"]' allows a
deduction for an (1) ordinary and (2) necessary (3) expense (4)
incurred in the taxable year (5) in carrying on a trade or business.2
Voluminous litigation under this provision has raised many impor-
tant questions, 3 the most difficult being the distinction between a
deductible business expense and a capital expenditure for which no
current deduction is allowed. 4 Previous judicial opinions examining
this important issue consist of "little more than a description of the
expenditure .. and a conclusion that it is, or is not, capital,"' 5 and
have left the law in "a state of hopeless confusion. '6 The cause of
such superficial treatment is the use of analytic tools that are not
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 [hereinafter cited as IRC].
2 Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971).
3 See generally J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 44-55 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as CHOMMIE].
' IRC § 263. That section provides that no deduction shall be allowed for amounts "paid
out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the
value of any property or estate."
IRC §§ 162, 263 are not totally inclusive. Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n,
403 U.S. 345,358 (1971); Iowa Southern Utilities Co. v. Commissioner, 333 F.2d 382,385 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 946 (1964). Analytically, an item may be characterized as a capital
expenditure without any reference to § 263. See, e.g., George L. Schultz, 50 T.C. 688, 698
(1968), aff'd per curiam, 420 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1970) (costs not described in § 263 may still be
subject to capitalization on the ground that they were preoperating or acquisition costs). See
also CHOMMIE § 50, at 104. One commentator finds that § 263 is redundant in light of § 162
and that its only apparent function "in the statutory scheme is to provide a heading under
which the tax services can list the capital expenditure cases." Gunn, The Requirement that a
Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 443, 448 (1974).
5 Gunn, supra note 4.
The Board of Tax Appeals early observed that in capital expenditure cases "no court has
ever yet attempted to make a definition that can apply to any case except the one under
review." American Seating Co., 4 B.T.A. 649, 658 (1926), acquiesced inpart, VII-1 CuM. BULL. 2
(1928).
6 Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 785 (2d Cir. 1973) (referring to
intangible assets).
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consistent with the ultimate purpose of the Code-the determina-
tion and taxation of net income.7
Two recent decisions, Colorado Springs National Bank v. United
States,8 and First Security Bank of Idaho v. Commissioner, 9 illustrate the
quandary in which the law now finds itself. The taxpayer banks in
both instances contended that certain expenses incurred in starting
a credit card operation were deductible as business expenses pur-
suant to section 162(a). The government argued that a credit card
operation was a new line of business for the banks. Preoperating
costs of setting up the credit card system were not incurred in
"carrying on a trade or business," and, therefore, did not qualify as
section 162 deductions. It also contended that since the outlays
would enhance future years' income, they were consequently not
ordinary but rather capital expenditures.
Both courts hesitated to embrace the government's traditionally
phrased and narrowly focused arguments which ignored the pur-
pose of the capital-noncapital classification-the accurate reflection
of the taxpayer's net income in a given year. While holding the
disputed expenditures to be deductible, neither court suggested a
satisfactory alternative analysis. One possible approach would be to
rely on generally accepted accounting principles to determine
whether the allowance or exclusion of a specific expense would
better reflect the taxpayer's net income in a given year.10
" Griswold, An ArgumentAgainst theDoctrine thatDeductions ShouldBe Narrowly ConstruedAs
a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1142, 1146-47 (1943). "The fundamental fact is
that Congress has given every indication that what it intends to tax is net income; and a
construction which leads in substance to a tax on gross income is just as inconsistent with the
statute as one which allows a taxpayer to receive income free from tax." Id. Accord, REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION 60 (1970).
8 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
9 63 T.C. 644, CCH 1975 TAX CT. REP. Dec. No. 33,081 (1975).
10 This more flexible rule is by no means a novel suggestion. It has been alluded to by
court (Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970)), commentator
(Gunn, supra note 4, at 452; Nolan, The Merit in Conformity of Tax to Financial Accounting, 50
TAXES 761 (1972)), and the President's Task Force on Business Taxation:
The objective of generally accepted accounting principles and tax accrual concepts is
basically the same--the determination of the net income of the business on an annual
basis. Both business taxpayers and government auditors are generally familiar with
accounting principles, and compliance would be facilitated by conforming the de-
termination of taxable income more closely with such principles. Business taxpayers
would have greater confidence in the fairness and integrity of the tax if such
differences were minimized.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT's TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION 60 (1970).
The Treasury has also recognized the need for greater conformity and has made some
effort to amend the Regulations to that end. For example, in 1971 the Regulations were
amended to permit accrual basis taxpayers to treat advance payments received on the sale of
goods as income at the time such amounts are treated as earned for financial accounting
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I
CONVENTIONAL SECTION 162 DOCTRINE
Under section 162(a), a taxpayer engaged in carrying on a trade
or business may deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred in a given taxable year." In determining whether "start-
up" (preoperating) costs are deductible business expenses or non-
deductible capital expenditures, two of the five criteria 12 embodied
in section 162(a) are particularly important. The first is that the
expense be "ordinary";13 the second, the requirement that the ex-
pense be incurred while "carrying on a trade or business."' 4 The
distinction is of great importance to the taxpayer; if an item is found
to be a capital asset rather than a currently deductible expense, its
cost may, at best, be recovered only through amortization over the
life of the asset. 5 Moreover, if the taxpayer cannot demonstrate that
the capital asset has a determinable useful life, the taxpayer is unable
to amortize its costs at all,' 6 and the only tax benefit gained results
from an increased cost basis' 7 in the asset.' 8
purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5 (1971). In fact, the language of § 446(a) of the Code, which
requires that "[t]axable income shall be computed under the method of accounting on the
basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books," suggests this
very approach. Section 446(b) permits the taxpayer's income to be recomputed when it is
found that the taxpayer's method "does not clearly reflect income." The broad perspective
suggested by § 446 would be a welcome addition to the typically narrow tests created by the
courts in § 162 litigation. Section 446(a)-(b) is set out in note 105 infra.
11 Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345,352 (1971). See notes 2-3
sup" .
12 See text accompanying note 2 supra. In Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 1974), the government also made the argument that
certain expenses were not "necessary." However, in light of the broad interpretation the
Supreme Court has given "necessary" (Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (all
expenses that are "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's business qualify as necessary)), it
is unlikely that a start-up expense would be found nondeductible on that basis.
13 See notes 19-30 and accompanying text infra.
14 See notes 31-42 and accompanying text infra.
Is IRC §§ 167, 611-13A. The taxpayer will eventually, of course, be able to recover his
entire expenditure, less a salvage value, if any, through depreciation or depletion allowances.
Nevertheless, basic time value of money principles make it advantageous to the taxpayer to be
able to deduct the total expense in the current year, thereby reducing his current tax bill and
increasing his current after-tax income.
16 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960) permits depreciation of intangible assets only when the
taxpayer is able to estimate the useful life of the asset with "reasonable accuracy." See note 79
infra.
17 The tax benefit may be realized in two ways. If the asset is sold, the increased basis
when subtracted from the sales price (amount realized) yields a smaller capital gain. IRC
§§ 1001-02, 1011-12, 1016. A tax benefit may also accrue under the loss provisions of the
Code. ld. § 165.
" If the asset is inseparable from the business, as is goodwill, then no tax benefit can be
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A. Capital or Ordinary
To categorize an expense as "ordinary" for the purposes of
section 162(a), generally, it must be shown that the expense was
incurred and associated with the production of income in a given
taxable year.19 An expense that, for example, benefits income in two
years must be apportioned between them. Part is deductible in the
first tax year; the remainder, the deferred expense, is treated as an
asset on the balance sheet in the first year and is deducted in the
second.20
The traditional approach to the question of whether an item is
capital or ordinary has been to focus on discrete aspects -of the
transaction. The test most often employed has been whether the
expenditure would create some "ensuing benefit" in subsequent
years.21 Simply stated, an expenditure should be capitalized
realized until all or part of the business is sold or merged. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1966). See
Rev. Rul. 70-45, 1970-1 GuM. BULL. 17. This rule ignores one of the most basic principles of
modern financial accounting-the assumption of continuity. Thus, many legitimate expendi-
tures, which sound accounting practice dictates should be deducted from gross income, are
disallowed as deductions by the Code. See notes 88-91 and accompanying text infra.
19 Treas. Reg. § 1-461-1(a)(1) (1960) (cash basis taxpayers) (1957); id. § 1.461-1(a)(2)
(accrual basis taxpayers). A possible exception to this general rule is found where expendi-
tures made to maintain or manage a building devoted to rental purposes are currently
deductible despite the fact that the property generates no current revenue. Id. § 1.212-1(b)
(1960). The regulations explain this apparent conflict by focusing on a broad definition of
income in § 212 rather than by creating an exception to the annual accounting principle. Id.
20 This method of deferring expenses mirrors the basic principle of accrual accounting
requiring that costs be matched with the revenues they produce in a given accounting period.
Hence, contrary to the lay notion than an asset is a form of property rather than an expense,
as a matter of accounting theory, an asset is nothing more than a capitalized cost. DeCapriles,
Modern Financial Accounting, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1001, 1020-21 (1962). For example, an auto-
mobile with a useful life of five years which costs $5,000 will be treated on the income
statement as an expense of $ 1,000 per year for the next five years. Until expensed, the balance
of the purchase price will appear on the asset side of the balance sheet. This account does not
represent the physical property but rather identifies a cost already incurred that is associated
with the production of revenue in future accounting periods.
21 The most important criterion under this formulation is whether the current outlay
contributes to the production of income in future periods. Expenditures for plant and
equipment, as well as intangible assets, have traditionally been categorized as capital and
therefore nondeductible on this basis. Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d
814 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 722 (1937) (solicitation costs and the costs of hook-ups to
gas mains held nondeductible capital expenditures because the establishment of goodwill and
the elimination of competition represented something of permanent value). Other factors are,
however, considered by the courts: (1) Are the expenses recurring? See, e.g., Cincinnati, N.O.
& T.P. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970). But see Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
United States, 347 F.2d 275 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (deduction of one-time construction costs of
substitute facilities for landowner to replace those demolished by expanding open-pit mine).
(2) Is there a general plan of reconditioning? See Bayles & Rich, Repair or Capital Expense: The
Tenth Circuit's General Plan ofBetterment Rule, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 272. For a general discussion
of the relative impact of these various factors, see Shugerman, Basic Criteria for Distinguishing
1976]
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if it brings about the acquisition of an asset having a period of
useful life in excess of one year or if it secures a like advantage to
the taxpayer which has a life of more than one year.22
Dissatisfaction with this criterion among the lower courts23 led
the Supreme Court to suggest a new formulation in Commissioner v.
Lincoln Savings & Loan Association.24 In that case, the taxpayer sav-
ings and loan association was required to pay a yearly assessment, in
addition to regular insurance premiums, to the federal agency that
insured the accounts of its depositors. It sought to deduct this
assessment as an ordinary business expense under section 162. In
finding such payments to be nondeductible, the Court posited a new
test:
What is important and controlling.., is that the.., payment
serves to create or enhance for Lincoln what is essentially a separate
and distinct additional asset and that, as an inevitable conse-
quence, the payment is capital in nature .... 25
The Second Circuit interpreted Lincoln Savings to be a "radical
shift in emphasis" '26 and proceeded to use the "separate-asset" test as
an inflexible criterion for capital-noncapital categorizations. There
was nothing in Lincoln Savings, however, that would indicate that the
Court intended to do more than describe existing law.27 Since 1960,
the regulations have provided that outlays which "result in the
creation of an asset having a useful life which extends substantially
beyond the close of the taxable year" are capital in nature. 8
Moreover, the converse of that rule-that expenditures that do not
result in the creation of an asset are currently deductible even
lRevenue Charges From Capital Expenditures in Income Tax Computations, 49 MICH. L. REV. 213
(1950). See also 1 J. RABKIN & M.JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME Girr & ESTATE TAXATION §§ 3.02,
.08, .10 (1973).
22 Hotel Kingkade v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1950).
23 In attempting to limit the impact and application of the "ensuing-benefit" doctrine, the
Tenth Circuit has stated that the traditional rule was
intended to serve as a mere guidepost for the resolution of the ultimate issue, not as
an absolute rule requiring the automatic capitalization of every expenditure provid-
ing the taxpayer with a benefit enduring for a period in excess of one year.
United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968).
24 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
25 Id. at 354 (emphasis added). The payments by Lincoln Savings were made to the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. The Court was careful to point out that Lincoln
had acquired a distinct property interest as a result of those payments. That interest was in
many respects analogous to a prepaid insurance account, which must be capitalized as a
deferred expense even by taxpayers who do not use accrual accounting. Commissioner v.
Boylston Market Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942).
26 Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1973).
27 Gunn, supra note 4, at 444.
28 See note 19 supra.
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though there is some ensuing benefit-had been judicially expressed
prior to Lincoln Savings. 2 9 It thus was not the novelty of the rule but
rather the eagerness of the Second Circuit to adopt a simplistic test
for distinguishing capital and ordinary expenditures that led it to
treat Lincoln Savings as some great revelation.
The real issue posed by Lincoln Savings and its progeny is not
whether the "ensuing-benefit" test or the "separate-asset" test is
proper; the crucial question is whether any single litmus paper
standard satisfactorily can embody all the factors that should be
considered in drawing the distinction between ordinary deductible
expenses and capital outlays. Justice Cardozo long ago answered the
question in the negative:
One struggles in vain for any verbal formula that will supply a
ready touchstone.... Life in all its fullness must supply the answer
to the riddle.30
His comment, however, indicates only the breadth of the search. It
leaves the articulation of a practical analytical tool to distinguish
capital expenditures from deductible business expenses for future
decision. Until some court takes the initiative in defining this new
standard, the tax planner is left to wonder whether a particular
outlay will be considered capital in nature by a court applying any
one of the traditional tests.
B. Operating versus Preop eating
Section 162 also requires that an expense be incurred while
"carrying on [a] trade or business" before a deduction will be al-
lowed. The purpose of this requirement would appear to be to
distinguish personal from business expenditures.3 1 Further, the dis-
tinction between capital expenditures 'and deductible expenses is
drawn by the word "ordinary" in the statute.32 Nonetheless, courts
have relied upon this language to develop a rule providing that
expenditures made to start a business or to enable an established
business to expand into a new field, must be capitalized. 33 Thus,
29 David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 381-82 (1970) (concurring opinion, Tannenwald, J.)
(concept of capitalization of expenditures limited to "cases of acquisition of tangible assets, or
intangible assets, such as a license or goodwill or a going business, or preparation for engaging
in a new field of endeavor").
30 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
31 Strictly speaking, this criterion is unnecessary in light of IRG § 262 which denies
deductions for personal expenses.
'32 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114-16 (1933).
33 This rule has been sharply criticized on the ground that mere corporate existence is
the equivalent of doing business. See Erbacher, Start-Up Costs: Are They Deductible by a Corpora-
1976]
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a distinction is made between operating and preoperating
expenses-the former are deductible under section 162; the latter
are deemed capital in nature.34 The justification for the rule, predi-
cated on the net-income premise of the Code,3 5 and the annual
nature of the tax assessment,36 is that expenditures made to secure a
stream of future income cannot be charged to current taxable in-
come.37 Although this rationale is correct, the same result is reached
under the "ordinary" or the "incurred-in-the-taxable-year" re-
quirements of section 162.
The leading cases interpreting the "carrying-on-business" rule
involve corporations created to operate radio and television sta-
tions.3 8 These decisions have held that a corporation is not carrying
on a trade or business for the purposes of section 162 until its station
is licensed and broadcasting. 39 The rationale of these cases presum-
ably is that prelicense expenditures would produce income over a
period of years at least equal to the term of the license and to allow a
current deduction would distort taxpayers' net income.40 To the
tion for Federal Income Tax Purposes?, 48 TAXES 488 (1970). See also CHOMMIE § 50, at 111
(collecting cases on preinvestment expenditures).
34 It is at once evident that this distinction is just another variation of the "ensuing-
benefit" test, the presumption being that if an expenditure is preoperating it must have an
ensuing benefit.
35 Griswold, supra note 7, at 1146-47.
36 IRC § 441 requires that a taxpayer compute his taxable income on an annual basis,
which in most instances is the annual period used in keeping his books. See generally CHOMMIE
§ 80.
37 See, e.g., Weinstein v. United States, 420 F.2d 700, 701 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
38 Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965); KWTX Broadcasting Co., 31 T.C. 952, aff'd per curiam, 272 F.2d
406 (5th Cir. 1959); Radio Station WBIR, Inc., 31 T.C. 803 (1959); Petersburg Television
Corp., 20 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 271 (1961).
39 In the leading case, Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965), the taxpayer deducted expenses incurred in
training personnel for the operation of a television station before obtaining a license and
commencing to broadcast. The Fourth Circuit disallowed the deduction because the expenses
were incurred between the time of the decision to establish a business and actual commence-
ment of broadcasting operations. The court held that
even though a taxpayer has made a firm decision to enter into business and over a
considerable period of time spent money in preparation for entering that business,
he still has not "engaged in carrying on any trade or business" within the intend-
ment of section 162(a) until such time as the business has begun to function as a
going concern and performed those activities for which it was organized.
Id. at 907. This test of commencement of the ultimate activity for which the enterprise was
organized has been criticized by commentators as unrealistic. See Erbacher, supra note 33, at
498-500; Lee, Preoperating Expenses and Section 174: Will Snow Fall?, 27 TAX LAWYER 381,
394-96 (1974); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 498, 499 (1940) ("'carrying on any trade or
business'.., involves holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or
services").
40 Because of the difficulty in proving that an intangible asset is created by preoperating
[Vol. 61:618624
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extent that the "carrying-on-a-trade-or-business" criterion of these
cases clearly reflected this principle, the proper result was reached. 41
There remains the danger, however, that a court will focus on the
label "carrying on business," as courts have done in resolving the
ordinary-capital issue, without examining the underlying princi-
ples.42
II
IN PURSUIT OF A NEW STANDARD
Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States43 and First Security
Bank of Idaho v. Commissioner4 4 illustrate many of the dangers of
applying the traditional tests discussed above. Although the deci-
sions neither renounce these tests nor formulate new ones, they
expenditures and that such asset has a determinable useful life, there is the danger that no
deduction would ever be allowed. Congress, recognizing this possible inequity, enacted IRC
§ 248 as partial relief. It permits a corporation to treat its organizational expenditures as
deferred expenses that may be amortized over a period of five years. Previously, those
expenses could only be deducted over the life of the corporation; because most corporate
charters do not provide for a definite end to corporate existence, no "useful life" of the
expenditures was ascertainable and no deduction was allowed.
The relief afforded by § 248, although salutary, is only partial, because it applies only to
newly formed corporations and only to a limited range of incorporation expenses. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.248-1(b) (1956). If a corporation plans to expand its business to a new field, it must
form a subsidiary to take advantage of this section. A more satisfactory solution would be to
extend the principle embodied in § 248 to business entities at all stages of existence by allowing
start-up costs to be treated as deferred expenses that might be amortized over a five-year
period.
Perhaps the most instructive aspect of § 248 is that Congress has, at least in this limited
area, recognized that it is unreasonable to require the taxpayer to demonstrate that a deferred
expense has an ascertainable useful life before any deduction is allowed. As a matter of
administrative efficiency and accounting reality, it would be preferable to allow an inaccurate
estimate, or provide one by statute, than to presume that the useful life is infinite. The tax
section of the American Bar Association has recently proposed that such a rule be added to the
Code. 29 TAX LAWYER 407 (1976). See note 88 infra.
41 A major difficulty is that many of these expenses cannot be deducted because they
represent assets whose useful life cannot be accurately estimated. See notes 15-18 and accom-
panying text supra.
42 For example, suppose in opening the radio station, the corporate taxpayer hires
someone to replace screens with storm windows. Because the station is not yet operating, the
costs of having this work done are preoperating and, therefore, capital in nature. The
expenditure, however, is a recurring one; twice each year, the taxpayer will have to hire
someone to interchange the storm windows and the screens. The initial work done provides
the taxpayer a benefit only in the year the cost was incurred. The presumption that requires its
capitalization does not clearly reflect income.
43 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974). See generally Comment, Colorado Springs National Bank
v. United States-Deductibility of Start-Up Expenses for a Credit Card Program, 1975 UTAH L. REv.
279.
44 63 T.C. 644, CCH '1975 TAx CT. REP. Dec. No. 33,081 (1975).
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reflect an increased willingness to examine tax events as part of the
entire economic life of the taxpayer and to reach decisions in accor-
dance with a characterization that more accurately reflects net in-
come.
The controversy in Colorado Springs National Bank arose when
the taxpayer bank joined the Mountain States Bankcard Association,
thereby enabling it to participate in the Master Charge credit card
system. In addition to paying a $10,000 one-time membership fee,
the bank incurred other costs including computer time, advertising,
solicitation, and employee training expenses.4 5 The bank attempted
to deduct these outlays as ordinary and necessary business expenses
under section 162. The Commissioner, however, disagreed, and
disallowed the attempted deductions on two grounds. First, they
were incurred to enable the bank to enter a new line of business
rather than to carry on a trade or business as required by section
162. Second, since the expenditures created an asset that would
benefit the bank's credit card operation in ensuing years, they were
not ordinary within the meaning of that section.
The district court found that, since the $10,000 membership fee
represented the right of the bank to handle Master Charge accounts,
it enhanced the bank's value as a going concern by creating an
intangible asset which was not currently deductible. 46 However,
despite the court's finding that the credit card field represented a
new line of business 4 7 it concluded that the rest of the start-up costs
were deductible because of their recurrent nature.48
45 There were six different types of costs incurred: (1) costs incurred in key punching
and entering customer account data into the MSBA computer system; (2) computer assess-
ment and service fees required by the MSBA for opening new accounts for bank customers;
(3) advertising and promotional costs necessary to familiarize customers with the Master
Charge Program; (4) charges for the services of credit investigating agencies; (5) travel,
education, and entertainment expenses of employees attending MSBA training and indoctri-
nation meetings; (6) wages for temporary clerical help. 505 F.2d at 1187.
46 73-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9795, at 82, 579 (D. Colo. 1973) (oral opinion). The bank did not
appeal this holding.
In First Security Bank of Idaho v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 644, CCH 1975 TAx CT. REP.
Dec. No. 33,081 (1975), the taxpayer bank found itself in a situation nearly identical to that of
the Colorado Springs National Bank. However, by allocating a $10,000 one-time fee to
"support and instructional services alone," rather than describing it as a license or member-
ship fee, the Idaho bank was allowed to deduct all fees and expenditures involved with the
start of its BankAmericard operation. Id. at 651, CCH 1975 TAX CT. REP. at 2347.
47 I find and I hold that this particular field, that is the credit card field, is a new type
of business that this bank had not engaged in prior to its being licensed by Master
Charge card association. It is notjust an extension of the lending field, but it is a new
concept that was developed and is being used.
Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9795, at 82,579 (D. Colo.
1973).
48 The largest single expense had been incurred in obtaining the credit bureau reports.
[Vol. 61:618
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The Tenth Circuit stated that it was not bound by the lower
court's conclusion that "the credit card field . . . is a new type of
business that this bank had not engaged in prior to its being
licensed. ' 49 Itjustified this position by explaining that the absence of
any credibility issues placed the reviewing court in "as good position
as was the trial court to draw those [ultimate] conclusions" 50 from
the disputed facts. The court's motivation for rejecting the district
court finding was undoubtedly the desire to permit the taxpayer to
deduct its expenses without directly challenging the well-entrenched
rule prohibiting the deduction of preoperating costs.51
The government framed its arguments in traditional terms. It
contended that the credit card operation represented an endeavor
apart from previous bank business; therefore, the traditional rule
-that expenses made in preparation for a new business are not de-
ductible--controlled. 52 This argument was supported by cases that
denied deductions to going concerns for expenses incurred in enter-
ing a new field, 53 opening a new branch, 54 or conducting a survey of
business possibilities. 55
The Tenth Circuit, rejecting this line of reasoning, held that the
bank had not engaged in a new line of business, but had merely
employed a new method to conduct its old business. The bank had
for years made consumer and commercial loans. The court found
The lower court thought that it was unusual for the government to contend that these
expenditures should be capitalized since the reports were a normal incident to the granting of
credit. The bank had in fact obtained such reports whenever loans were made in the past. This
caveat is in direct contravention to the court's holding that the credit card field was a new field
of business. See note 47 supra. Because the appellate court made independent findings of fact,
this apparent inconsistency was rendered moot.
The contradiction, however, can be explained in terms of traditional tax theory. The
membership fee was paid prior to the commencement of a new line of business; as a
broadcasting station begins operations when it begins broadcasting, the bank began its new
venture only after paying the fee. See text accompanying notes 31-42 supra. The subsequent
start-up costs, therefore, were incurred while the bank was carrying on its new business.
Although such an interpretation does not comport with Treas. Reg. § 1.248-1(a) (1956), which
attempts to distinguish between "being in existence" and "beginning business," it is consistent
with at least one theory of accounting and is the approach advocated by some commentators.
See Erbacher, supra note 33, at 493. See alsb Gunn, supra note 4.
49 73-2 U.S. Tax Gas. at 82,579.
50 505 F.2d at 1189.
'" See text accompanying notes 31-42 supra.
52 The government's objective in pursuing this "preoperating"-expense theory was to fit
the case within the rule of Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965). See note 39 supra.
53 This concept is best illustrated in the broadcasting license context. See cases cited in
note 38 supra.
54 Mid-State Products Co., 21 T.C. 696 (1954).
55 Davee v. United States, 444 F.2d 557 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
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that the bank's consumer loan function could now be performed by
the "handy, plastic card. '56 Furthermore; the credit card system
provided a simplified method for making commercial loans to mer-
chants. Instead of advancing credit to the merchant on accounts
receivable, the bank could discount payment from the credit card
transaction immediately- and receive the discount instead of collect-
ing interest on a loan. Thus, by focusing on the purpose of the
bank's activities rather than the means of implementing them, 57 the
court was able to sidestep the government's doctrinal arguments
against deductibility. Nevertheless, by preserving the distinction be-
tween "new methods" and "new business,' '5 8 the court obscured the
factors that most likely motivated its decision.
The government additionally urged the court to find that the
expenditures created a "separate and distinct" asset59 which would
have "ensuing benefit" 60 and should therefore be classified as "capi-
tal" rather than "ordinary."' 61 The court rejected this contention by
distinguishing those decisions that applied the "ensuing-benefit"
and "separate-and-distinct-asset" tests on the ground .that those
cases involved the creation of some property interest. The finding
that the Master Charge expenditures created no such right 62 evi-
56 505 F.2d at 1190.
57 The credit card system performs the same [loan] function more easily.... The
only change is in the method....
The credit card system enables a bank to carry on an old business in a new way. A
new method is distinguishable from a new business.
hIt.
58 This uneasy distinction between "new method" and "new business" falls squarely in
line with the Second Circuit's decision in Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d
775 (2d Cir. 1973). In that case, the taxpayer, manufacturer of Lofts Candy, set up a franchise
division to supplement the sagging retail sales of its own stores. The goal was to establish
agency and franchise outlets at a series of local drug stores. The court found that Lofts had
previously been in both the wholesale and retail business and that the franchise operation was
nothing more than a new method to develop new sales territory by an already ongoing
concern. It stated:
Every new idea and every change of method in making sales, even in promoting
special sales or developing new sales territory, do not require that the expenses
connected with the operation be non-deductible under § 162.
Id. at 782. Thus characterized as an ongoing concern, Lofts was not entering a new business;
the expenses therefore could not be validly categorized as preoperating and were properly
viewed as incurred while "carrying on a trade or business."
" See text accompanying notes 23-30 supra.
60 See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
61 The government also made a third argument that the expenses were not "necessary."
The court, citing Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933), summarily rejected this
contention by finding all the start-up costs in issue to be "appropriate and helpful." 505 F.2d at
1191.
62 "The start-up expenditures here challenged did not create a property interest. They
produced nothing corporeal or salable." 505 F.2d at 1192. The test proposed seemed to be
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denced the court's sympathy for the taxpayer but ignored the
characterization of many varieties of intangibles, including those not
salable, as distinct items of property for other tax purposes. 63
First Security Bank presented a nearly identical problem to the
Tax Court.64 Although the court held that Colorado Springs National
Bank controlled, 65 it found, contrary to that case, that no portion of
the fees charged to the taxpayer for participation in the Bank-
Americard system constituted a license fee. 66 This particular finding
was supported by the taxpayer's allocation of the entire fee to vari-
ous services provided by the licensor in conjunction with the grant-
ing of the license 67 and no part of it to the right to participate and
use the licensor's trademark.68
whether the expense was ordinary in light of the "kind of transaction out of which the
obligation arose and its normalcy in the particular business." Id. at 1193, quoting Deputy v. du
Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 496 (1940). The additional guide this standard contributes is not evident
from the decision.
63 One court, for example, found that sums paid by a local bottler to its franchisor to
secure the elimination of an unprofitable middleman contract were capital in nature.
Darlington-Hartsville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 494 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968) (following Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d
901 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965)). But see Cleveland Allerton Hotel,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 805, 807 (6th Cir. 1948) (cost of release from burdensome
lease deductible in year incurred).
64 The two petitioning banks in this case were owned by the same bank holding company.
They could consequentlyjoin the association as a single unit. Each bank therefore paid its pro
rata share of the costs incurred. 63 T.C. at 646 n.7, CCH 1975 TAX CT. REP. at 2344 n.7. For
the purposes of this Note they may be regarded as a single entity.
5 The Tax Court did not even pause to reconsider the validity of the government's
arguments. After noting that the contentions of both parties were essentially identical to those
made in Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, the court simply stated that "[u]nder the precise facts
presented here we follow [the Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank] holding with regard to both
[banks]." Id. at 650, CCH 1975 TAX. CT. REP. at 2346.
The court also cited Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971), in support of its decision. That case held that the Tax Court
will follow the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the same circuit in which the case arises.
Id. at 756-57. The implication is, of course, that the Tax Court inFirstSecurityBank, deciding a
controversy arising in the Tenth Circuit, had no alternative but to follow the result of the
Tenth Circuit in Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank. The court in First Security Bank did indicate,
however, that apart from the mandate of the Golsen decision, it was in agreement with the
holding of Colorado Springs Nat'lBank. 63 T.C. at 650 n.19, CCH 1975 TAx. CT. REP. at 2346
n.19.
66 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
67 Id.
8 63 T.C. at 651, CCH 1975 TAX. CT. REP. at 2347. The contract with BankAmericard
provided and the court found that the $10,000 part of the fee for support and services that the
government contended was equivalent to a license fee would not have been required had the
bank already possessed "the operational know-how of a nationwide consumer credit card
system as well as computer programming adequate to maintain said system." Id. at 651, CCH
1975 TAX CT. REP. at 2347. Despite this rationale, it is difficult to accept the conclusion that no
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The approach taken by the parties and the courts in First Se-
curity Bank and Colorado Springs National Bank indicates the tradi-
tional tendency to rely on labels to solve what are largely accounting
problems. The government, emphasizing that the credit card opera-
tion was a new business 69 and that future benefits would flow from
the bank's start-up costs, 7 0 concluded that they were expenditures
that should be capitalized. The taxpayers, relying on Lincoln Savings,
maintained that the future-benefit test was not controlling and that
because the expenditures in question did not create a separate and
distinct asset, they were deductible. 7' Framing the issue in this man-
ner obscures the real question. A more illuminating approach is to
apply accounting concepts and attack the clear-reflection-of-income
question directly.
license fee was embodied anywhere in the $25,000 charge. See text accompanying notes 86-87
infra.
A typical contract right similar in substance to credit card association membership fees is
the franchise. The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that where the franchise agreement
provides for an undefined succession of automatic renewals, it has an indefinite useful
life, and consequently, may not be amortized. Rev. Rul. 66-140, 1966-1 GUM. BULL. 45.
Unless a franchise contract by its terms specifically limits the duration of the right, the
taxpayer will be unable to meet the burden of demonstrating a definite and ascertainable
useful life. See, e.g., Toledo TV Cable Co., 55 T.C. 1107 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 483 F.2d 1398
(9th Cir. 1973). But see Super Food Services, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1236 (7th Cir.
1969) (summary judgment for government reversed where taxpayer offered statistical proof
of average useful life of franchise).
A recent Tax Court decision, Rodeway Inns of America v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 414,
CCH 1974 TAX CT. REP. Dec. No. 32,994 (1974), acquiesced in, 1975-19 INT. REv. BuLt.m rN 6,
reflects an increased judicial willingness to examine all economic factors that determine the
useful life of a franchise right. In that case, the court first found that the payments made by a
franchisor to cancel a franchise agreement were capital in nature when the franchisee surren-
dered its exclusive right to the franchise for the 26 years remaining in the agreement. The
court then rejected the government's rigid doctrinal argument that the useful life of the
capital asset thus required was 26 years, and independently determined a useful life of five
years. But see Eagle Pass & Piedras Negras Bridge Co., 23 B.T.A. 1338 (1931), where, on
analogous facts, the court willingly followed the government's reasoning without regard to an
independent assessment of the actual useful life of the repurchased franchise.
69 mhe crucial question with regard to the deductibility of these start-up expenses is
whether taxpayer's Master Charge program was a new business, separate and apart
from its existing lending or credit operations or whether it was merely an extension
of that established business.
Brief for Appellant at 13, Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th
Cir. 1974).
70 The start-up costs were characterized as "basically one-time costs that were instrumen-
tal iri creating an assetLthe Master Charge System as a going concern-that had a useful life
and'substantial potential economic benefit for many years to come." Id. at 19.
71 The taxpayer argued that Lincoln Savings had "completely abrogated the previously
existing general rule" that looked to the "ensuing benefit" to determine whether an expendi-
ture was deductible. Brief for Appellee at 19, Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States,
505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
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III
THE "CLEAR-REFLECTION-OF-INCOME" TEST
The goal of financial accounting is to match current expenses
with current income and thus determine current net income.7 2 To
the accountant there is no real distinction between a deferred ex-
pense and an asset.73 Each represents a current expenditure, all or
part of which will have an income-producing (or cost-reducing)
impact in a future accounting period.7 4 Depreciation and deple-
tion 75 of tangible assets, amortization of intangible assets, and
capitalization of prepaid expenses all serve the expenditure-revenue
matching function. To the extent that these generally accepted
accounting conventions accurately portray net income,7 6 financial
accounting principles should supply the criteria for tax deductibil-
ity.77
The Code requires an initial determination of whether an ex-
penditure is currently deductible or a capital asset.7 8 The- taxpayer
may be entitled to amortize the asset if able to prove a definite and
determinable useful life.7 9 If he cannot do so, however, the regula-
72 Accounting, like federal income taxation, is based on discrete periods. It is concerned
primarily with measuring and recording the economic activity of an organization for a given
time interval. See generally G. WELSCH, C. ZLATKOVICH &J. WHITE, INTERMEDIATE AccouNTING
18-19 (1972).
73 See note 20 supra.
74 See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
7' Cost depletion of natural resources serves the same purpose as depreciation. It allows a
mine owner, for example, to recover the cost of minerals without taxation. IRC § 611. See
generally CHOMMIE § 68. Percentage depletion, however, allows a percentage of income as a
deduction regardless of the amount invested in the asset. IRC § 613. Using this method,
expenses in excess of actual costs may be recovered by the taxpayer. See.generally CHOMMIE
§ 69.
76 Net income is the dominant concept in accounting, and all conventions are necessarily
directed toward accurately ascertaining net income. R. JAEDICKE & R. SPROUSE, ACCOUNTING
FLowS: INCOME, FUNDS, AND CASH 6 (1965).
77 The extent to which financial and tax accounting should conform has sparked a lively
debate. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION 60 (1970); Barrett
& Holtz, The Case Against One Set of Books for Financial and Tax Accounting, 40 FINANCIAL
EXECUTIVE, Dec. 1972, at 30; Nolan, supra note 10; Roby & Richter, Conformity of Tax and
Financial Accounting, 139 J. OF ACCOUNTANCY, Jan. 1975, at 42.
78 This point was stressed by the government in an attempt to frame the issue without
regard to the economic consequences of its resolution: "Whether such capitalized items could
... be amortized ... or whether such costs are recoverable only by way of return of basis on
sale, or by way of a loss deduction ... is a question which is not presented in the instant case
.. " Reply Brief for Appellant at 4, Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d
1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
7' The useful life of an intangible asset must be "known from experience or other factors
to be of use in the business.., for only a limited period, the length of which can be estimated
19761
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tions effectively presume that the asset has an indefinite useful life,
and, therefore, no deduction is allowed. Typical of such an expendi-
ture is the $10,000 membership fee paid by the Colorado Springs
National Bank to enable it to participate in the regional Master
Charge credit card operation."0 That expenditure was partially re-
sponsible for the current income from the Master Charge program.
The remainder contributed to income earned in subsequent years.
The supposedly indeterminable nature of the latter portion's useful
life8' precludes a deduction for any part of that fee either as a
current expense or as an amortizable capital expenditure. 82 To the
extent that the fee produces income currently, denial of the deduc-
tion artificially inflates the bank's income.83 A current deduction for
the entire amount would understate income in the year it is taken. 84
The court in Colorado Springs National Bank explicitly recognized this
taxpayer dilemma and found that the taxpayer's position rep-
resented a more equitable approach:
The government suggests no way in which [the start-up expendi-
tures] could be amortized. The government's theoretical approach
ignores the practicalities of the situation, and permits a distortion
of taxpayer's financial situation. If an expenditure, concededly of
with reasonable accuracy." Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6,452, 1960-1
CUM. BULL. 127. No allowance for depreciation is permitted where "in the unsupported
opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible asset has a limited useful life." Id. Thus, the burden of
proving a specific useful life with reasonable accuracy is on the taxpayer. When the Commis-
sioner finds that the taxpayer has not met this burden, the taxpayer is not entitled to any
deduction. This formulation has been criticized as undesirable when "a deduction may ... be
preferable if it avoids distortion of income." Comment, supra note 43, at 290.
'0 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
81 See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
82 Modern accounting practice recognizes this distortion and permits the taxpayer to
make an estimate of the useful life of intangible assets. See notes 88-91 and accompanying text
infra.
83 The district court's allowance in Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank of a current deduction
despite its specific ruling that the Master Charge operation for all expenses excepting the
membership fee was a new line of business (and therefore presumably not deductible) can be
explained only on these grounds. 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9,795, at 82,580. The court added that
the nondeductible $10,000 membership fee should be amortized over a reasonable period
despite unanimous authority to the contrary. Id.
84 The court in Colorado Springs Nat'lBank, in treating deductibility and amortization as a
single issue rather than as two separate questions, as urged by the government, chose the more
desirable alternative from an accounting standpoint. The principle of conservativism indicates
that between two conflicting alternatives, the one that shows the least favorable result in the
short term should be chosen. G. WELSCH, C. ZLATKOVICH & J. WHiTE, supra note 72, at 22.
Moreover, the continuity assumption recognizes the business entity as a going concern and
presumes its indefinite existence. Id. at 8. This premise is completely contrary to the govern-
ment's suggestion that these expenditures should not be recognized until the bank's sale or
liquidation.
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temporal value, may be neither expensed nor amortized, the
adoption of technological advances is discouraged. 85
An "all-or-nothing" rule for deductibility not only distorts the
taxpayer's net income but also encourages the misdescription of
expenditures. The banks86 in Colorado Springs NationalBank and First
Security Bank each had to pay $25,000 to the credit card licensor for
the right to participate and to receive support and training services.
The Colorado bank was unable to deduct $10,000 of this fee because
it was denominated a license fee. First Security, however, was able to
deduct the entire $25,000 because it allocated the entire amount to
specific services received from the national credit card operation.
Apparently, the court was not troubled by the fact that no value was
attributed to the right to participate in the program or use the
BankAmericard trademark. Hence, identical expenditures were
taxed differently in the two cases solely because the second taxpayer
used a self-serving label to describe the expenditure. Under this
approach, deductibility depends on formal definitions which en-
courages taxpayer manipulation. Adoption of a substantive rule that
followed generally accepted accounting practice would make de-
ductibility turn on the substance of the transaction rather than the
label attached.
Although the Code presumes that many intangible assets have
an unlimited useful life, modern accounting practice is to the con-
trary.8 8 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
requires that businesses amortize all intangible assets "over the
period estimated to be benefited. ' '89 The estimate must be reason-
Is 505 F.2d at 1192. Even the government seemed grudgingly to admit the importance of
accounting principles, and consequently attempted to justify its position in those terms: "[T]he
cost of acquiring such intangibles having a useful life beyond one year has long been consid-
ered capital in nature . . . for the purpose of financial accounting ...." Reply Brief for
Appellant at 6. The government also argued that a current deduction would mismatch
expenditures and revenues and understate income. Brief for Appellant at 20. It would
appear, however, that the government is not willing to follow accounting principles in situa-
tions where their application decreases taxable income.
'6 See note 64 supra.
'7 The court did not include the right to use the "service marks" and the BankAmericard
logo in the list of expensible services received. First Security Bank of Idaho v. Commissioner,
63 T.C. 644, CCH 1975 TAX CT. REP. Dec. No. 33,081, at 2,347 (1975).
88 Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956) with A.P.B. Opinion No. 17, 2 A.P.B. AccouNT-
ING PRINCIPLEs 6661 (1973). The tax section of the American Bar Association has recently
recommended that the Code be amended to allow amortization of the adjusted basis of
intangible assets ratably over the class life of such assets as prescribed by regulation. This
provision would apply to all intangibles that are currently not amortizable. The Commissioner
would have discretion to prescribe class lives of from 60 to 480 months; the upper limit is the
same as that now required by A.P.B. Opinion No. 17.
89 A.P.B. Opinion No. 17, supra note 88, at 6662, 9.
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able in light of certain specified factors, 90 but in no event may the
period be longer than forty years. 91 Thus, accounting practice has
adopted a more logical presumption than has the Commissioner-
the value of intangible assets is eventually exhausted.
The issue of the relevance of accounting principles to tax
questions is not new. 92 Generally, this inquiry is made only when a
particular accounting method is required by a state or federal regu-
latory agency. 93 Since the goal of sound financial accounting is to
portray accurately the economic result of current operations and the
avowed purpose of the federal income tax is to determine net
income as a basis for levying the tax, 94 there is every reason to
resolve tax questions by reference to accounting practice.
The usefulness of sound accounting practice has long been
recognized by the Supreme Court.9 5 This policy was recently
reaffirmed in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co. 96 The specific issue in
9' Among the factors that should be considered in making a reasonable estimate of an
asset's useful life are:
a. Legal, regulatory, or contractual provisions may limit the maximum useful life.
b. Provisions for renewal or extension may alter a specified limit on useful life.
c. Effects of obsolescence, demand, competition, and other economic factors may
reduce a useful life.
d. A useful life may parallel the service life expectancies of individuals or groups of
employees.
e. Expected actions of competitors and others may restrict present competitive
advantages.
f. An apparently unlimited useful life may in fact be indefinite and benefits cannot
be reasonably projected.
g. An intangible asset may be a composite of many individual factors with varying
effective lives.
Id. at 6665, 27.
91 Id. at 6665, 29.
92 See, e.g., Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 562 (1932). In that case, the
Supreme Court held that it was not bound by the accounting methods imposed on the
taxpayer by the Interstate Commerce Commission. See also Schlude v. Commissioner, 371 U.S.
884 (1963); American Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
93 The taxpayer in Colorado Springs Natl Bank argued that the tax authorities should
defer to the requirement of the Comptroller of the Currency that the contested expenditures
be deducted rather than capitalized. 505 F.2d at 1188. The government attempted to distin-
guish this required treatment on the ground that the requirement's purpose was "to insure the
liquidity and solvency of national banks and the concurrent protection of the depositors and
shareholders." Brief for Appellant at 20 n.10.
To the extent that this purpose is consistent with the broader purpose of clearly reflecting
income, the taxpayer's argument is sound. The court followed the well-established rule that
the mandated accounting treatment "is not determinative, [but] it is a factor for considera-
tion." 505 F.2d at 1188. See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974). See notes
96-101 and accompanying text infra.
94 See note 7 supra.
95 Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 562 (1932); Commissioner v. Lincoln
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 355-56 (1971).
96 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
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that case was whether depreciation expenses of trucks used in con-
structing a hydro-electric dam were currently deductible or whether
those charges had to be capitalized as part of the cost of the proj-
ect.97 The Court announced its intention to resolve this issue "in a
manner that comports with accounting and taxation realities." 98 It
noted that the Federal Power Commission, the Idaho Public Utilities
Commission, and generally accepted accounting practice99 all re-
quired that these expenses be capitalized. Starting with the long-
accepted principle that agency-imposed accounting practices do not
necessarily dictate tax consequences,' 00 the Court concluded that:
where a taxpayer's generally accepted method of accounting is
made compulsory by the regulatory agency and that method
clearly reflects income, it is almost presumptively controlling of
federal income tax consequences.' 0
In several instances, lower courts have gone one step further
and relied exclusively on the taxpayer's accounting method in de-
termining whether to allow a current deduction. For more than
twenty years, the taxpayer in Fort Howard Paper Co.102 deducted
certain indirect overhead costs associated with the construction of
tangible assets as current, section 162 business expenses. 10 3 The
government contended that section 263 of the Code required that
they be capitalized along with the direct costs of labor and materi-
al.' 0 4 The Tax Court ruled that section 446,105 which requires that a
11 The narrow issue was one of timing, that is, whether the construction-related deprecia-
tion was to be "amortized and deducted over the shorter life of the equipment or... over the
longer life of the [dam]." Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 5-6, 12.
100 Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 562 (1932).
101 418 U.S. at 15 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
102 49 T.C. 275 (1967).
103 These construction projects were carried out by the taxpayer's normal maintenance
crew only during slack periods. Thus, it is very appealing to argue that these overhead costs
would have been incurred whether construction projects were undertaken or not. The
taxpayer argued, and the court seemed to agree, that using the "incremental-cost" method of
accounting does not require inclusion of overhead costs if such costs cannot be "directly
identified" with the project. Id. at 283 n.4. This argument ignores the allocation to overhead of
the costs of plans and drafting for these projects rather than their capitalization as part of the
cost of creating the assets. Id. at 278-79.
104 Id. at 283.
Section 263(a)(1) of the Code prohibits any deduction for amounts "paid out for new
buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any
property or estate." The government argued that § 263(a)(1) required all costs, including
indirect ones, to be capitalized. The Tax Court found that this section was not dispositive,
believing the true issue to be whether "petitioner's method of accounting 'clearly reflects
income' pursuant to the provisions of section 446." 49 T.C. at 284.
105 IRC § 446 provides in part:
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taxpayer's accounting method dearly reflect income, is "inextricably
intertwined" with the substantive provisions of the Code.10 6 Accord-
ing to the court, therefore, where a taxpayer has consistently treated
certain expenditures in a manner that dearly reflects net income
and that also comports with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples,' 0 7 the taxpayer's accounting practice should be allowed to
dictate tax treatment despite the contrary result arguably required
by section 263.
The Court of Claims' 0 8 considered and adopted this rule in
Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 109
by upholding the taxpayer's use of a de minimis rule that required
charging all expenditures of less than $500 to current operating
expenses without regard to their capital or noncapital nature."a 0
The government contended that many outlays deductible under
that rule were capital in nature because they were "created" assets
with useful lives longer than one year."' Nevertheless, the court
approved of the practice because it clearly reflected the taxpayer's
income," 2 and was in accordance with generally accepted account-
ing principles." 3 In discussing the relationship between sections 263
and 446," 4 the court concluded that "[tihe determinative question
(a) GENERAL RULE. Taxable income shall be computed under the method of
accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in
keeping his books.
(b) EXCEPTIONS. If ... the method used does not clearly reflect income, the
computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as... does clearly
reflect income.
This section, although constructed in the negative, appears to permit the taxpayer to
defend virtually any accounting decision as one that results in a clear reflection of income.
106 49 T.C. at 283.
107 Id. at 286. The court also noted that the government had in previous years not only
acquiesced in the taxpayer's method but actively employed it in making adjustments to its
returns. Id. at 286-87. The court noted considerable expert testimony in favor'of the tax-
payer's position, and cited six standard accounting texts. Id. at 285.
108 The Court of Claims had previously demonstrated its willingness to decide cases in
light of economic realities and sound accounting principles in Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
United States, 347 F.2d 275 (Ct. Cl. 1965). At one point, it described the government's
narrowly framed contentions as requiring that "a very small tail [wag] a very large dog." Id. at
283.
109 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
110 This method of accounting was required by the Interstate Commerce Commission on
the ground that detailed and expensive bookkeeping could be eliminated without adversely
impairing the ability of the financial statements to clearly reflect income. Id. at 565.
I Id. at 566-67.
112 The court noted that over the 17-year period of its application, the de minimis-rule
expenses disallowed by the Commissioner represented less than six-tenths of one percent of
the year's operating expenses. Id. at 571.
1,3 Id. at 569-70.
114 Corresponding to INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §§ 24, 41, respectively, under which the
case was decided. The considerations involved under § 263 are identical to those under § 162.
See note 4 supra.
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.. is not what is the useful life of the asset in question,... but does
the method of accounting employed clearly reflect income."" 15
One might object that a standard of "dear reflection of income"
as determined by generally accepted accounting principles is too
amorphous a rule to be practical since generally accepted accounting
principles represent a plurality of different and often inconsistent
policies." 6 Despite this difficulty, section 446 of the Code explicitly
allows a taxpayer to choose his accounting method subject only to
the condition that it dearly reflects income." 7 When a particular
practice comports with generally accepted accounting principles and
is consistently followed, an accurate flow of income will be re-
ported." 8 Hence, the courts and the Commissioner have made, 119
and continue to make, case-by-case determinations as to whether a
particular taxpayer's method of accounting dearly reflects income.
There is no reason to suspect that such a determination cannot also
be made under substantive provisions of the Code such as section
162 in order to determine whether capitalization or deduction of a
given expenditure will more accurately reflect current income.' 20
A second argument against the proposed test is that a taxpayer's
choice of an accounting technique is likely to be self-serving.' 2' This
would not, however, give rise to any problems in addition to those
that already exist under the Code's system of voluntary reporting; in
fact, tying tax accounting more closely to financial accounting would
have the salutary effect of decreasing a taxpayer's ability to ma-
nipulate his accounting records for tax purposes.
115 424 F.2d at 568.
116 A.P.B. Statement No. 4 137-40, 2 A.P.B. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 9083-84 (1973).
The Council of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants recognized that
"accounting principles that differ from those accepted in Opinions of the Accounting Princi-
ples Board can have substantial authoritative support and, therefore, can also be considered to
be generally accepted accounting principles." Id. at 140.
1'7 See note 105 supra.
118 It is important that an accounting method once chosen be consistently followed to
ensure that income is accurately portrayed. For example, in the CincinnatiRy. case it was found
that treating small capital expenditures as expenses did not distort net income appreciably.
Because the expenses were regularly made, the stream of expenses was comparable to yearly
depreciation deductions. Section 446(e) of the Code recognized the importance of consistency
by requiring a taxpayer to secure the permission of the Secretary of the Treasury or his
delegate before changing his regular method of accounting.
I" See text accompanying notes 102-15 supra.
12' Section 482 involves making such a substantive determination. That section empow-
ers the Commissioner in certain instances to "distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income"
among related taxpayers in order "clearly to reflect the income" of those persons. See generally
CHOMMIE § 218.
121 Section 446(e) of the Code provides some protection against the use of self-serving
accounting methods.
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Because the federal income tax laws embody certain policy
considerations that are not relevant to financial accounting, 122 a
direct correspondence between the two is neither possible nor desir-
able. However, if the capital-ordinary expense dichotomy were ex-
amined by reference to the clear-reflection-of-income test, the judi-
cial interpretation of the federal income tax laws would more closely
reflect economic realities.
CONCLUSION
Colorado Springs National Bank generates more questions than
answers. Although the conclusion reached is clearly correct, the
court's analysis is far from satisfying. First and most surprising is the
failure of the court to refer to Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co. 123 In
both cases, a government instrumentality mandated the taxpayer's
method of accounting. 124 The opinion of the Supreme Court in
Idaho Power states that if that method also clearly reflects income, the
accounting convention should be presumptively controlling for in-
come tax purposes. 25 The Tenth Circuit, in Colorado Springs Na-
tional Bank, should have elected to focus only on whether deducting
start-up expenses clearly reflected the taxpayer's net income. Sig-
nificantly, the court at least tangentially considered this approach
when it classified the government's approach as "theoretical" and as
122 The treatment of depreciation is an obvious example. The purpose of the pro-rata
deduction of an asset's cost from gross income is to reflect the part that asset contributed to
production of the year's output. For example, suppose a machine that required an initial
$1,000 investment must be replaced every ten years. Sound accounting practice would require
that $100 of that machine's cost be allocated to the income obtained from one year's produc-
tion. The Code, however, in its effort to encourage business investment, provides for acceler-
ated depreciation. IRC § 167(b). Rather than the pro-rata deductions used by accountants, this
provision of the Code allows a taxpayer to deduct a larger portion of the asset's cost in the
early years with correspondingly smaller deductions permitted in later years.
The Court of Claims recendy suggested several possible reasons for differences between
financial and tax accounting treatment of income received by a corporation before it actually
rendered services to the payor. In holding that the commissioner abused its discretion under
§ 446 by not permitting the taxpayer to defer recognition of such prepaid income, the court
commented that financial accounting and
well-known accounting principles ... essentially focus on a conservative matching of
income and expenses to the end that an item of income will be related to its
correlative expenditure. Tax accounting, on the other hand, starts from the premise
of a need for certainty in the collection of revenues and focuses on the concept of
ability to pay. Thus, under this theory, where an item of income has been received
even though as yet unearned, it should be subject to taxation because the taxpayer
has in hand (or otherwise available) the funds necessary to pay the tax due.
Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, Nos. 321-69, 81-71, at 8 (Ct. CL., Jan. 28, 1976) (slip
decision).
123 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
124 See note 93 supra.
125 See notes 95-101 and accompanying text supra.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
one permitting "a distortion of taxpayer's financial situation."'1 26 It
thus implicitly found that the bank's method of accounting provided
a more accurate assessment of its income than did tie method
suggested by the government.
Second, Colorado Springs National Bank and First Security Bank
show that judicious labelling can dictate tax consequences. The fees
paid in these two cases were for the same purpose and for the same
services. The tax treatment, therefore, should have been identical.
Finally, because courts are unwilling to adopt a more realistic
rule based upon the clear-reflection-of-income concept, they are
forced to deal with surrogate tests for deductibility-whether the
costs were preoperating, whether they resulted in an ensuing
benefit, or whether they created or enhanced an asset. These tests
are misbased in theory and illogical in application. There are many
significant aspects to the question of deductibility and all must be
examined to reach a proper characterization of the taxpayer's in-
come.' 27 The courts in Colorado Springs National Bank and First Se-
curity Bank failed to articulate a broader approach that would pro-
vide guidance in the future. These decisions thus represent only
another step in the still incomplete transition from one-dimensional
tests to a more sophisticated, modern analysis that focuses on the
ultimate issue-what classification most clearly reflects a taxpayer's
net income.
Robert L. Brown
William F. Lee
126 505 F.2d at 1192. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
127 Other factors would include those listed by Professor Shugerman and by the Account-
ing Principles Board. See Shugerman, supra note 21; note 90 supra.
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